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Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Changing Arab Information Order
MARWAN M. KRAIDY
American University
This article explores the impact of Arab reality television on Arab governance. Reality
television activates hypermedia space (Kraidy, 2006c), a broadly defined inter-media
symbolic field, because its commercial logic promotes ostensibly participatory practices
like voting, campaigning and alliance building via mobile telephones and the Internet.
How does hypermedia space contribute to changing the ways in which Arab citizens and
regimes access, use, create and control information? How do the new information
dynamics affect the way citizens and governments relate to each other? To address
these questions, this article focuses on recent social and political developments in Saudi
Arabia and Lebanon, treating the two countries as a dynamic pair whose multi-faceted
interactions shape a pan-Arab hypermedia space. This article will endeavor to explain
how various Saudi and Lebanese actors have appropriated the reality TV show Star
Academy for social and political purposes, and how increased public awareness of the
hypermedia space engendered by the program has affected the nature of governance in
the two countries. This article concludes with a discussion of how hypermedia space
contributes to shifts in the nature and boundaries of social and political agency.
When scholars and policy makers contemplate the Arab “media revolution,” they mostly think of
Al-Jazeera and its news competitors. They are guided by the assumption that all-news satellite television
networks are the predominant, even the single, shaper of the Arab public sphere, a perspective
exacerbated by the September 11, 2001 attacks. This article presents an alternative view, emphasizing
instead the combined impact of Arab entertainment television and small media such as mobile phones on
Arab governance. It explores how entertainment television is an active contributor to shaping what Arab
publics discuss and do in both the social and political realms. It focuses specifically on reality television’s
social and political impact, which stems primarily from its activation of new communication processes
between a variety of information and media technologies creating what I call “hypermedia space.” In the
new Arab information order, reality television activates hypermedia space because it promotes
participatory practices like voting, campaigning and alliance building, via mobile telephones and related
devices.
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Hypermedia space is a broadly defined symbolic field created by interactions between multiple
media, from micro text-messaging to region-wide satellite broadcasting. The term “hypermedia” captures
the technological convergence and media saturation that characterize many contemporary societies, while
emphasizing the speed and convergence of communication processes. The “interoperatibility of oncediscrete media … linked together into a single seamless web of digital-electronic-telecommunications”
(Deibert, 1997, pp. 114-115) creates a space with many “points of access” that are personalized, mobile,
non-conspicuous and networked, and therefore not easily subjected to overt social or political control.
Even as technological convergence in the Arab world is still in its infancy, Arab hypermedia space is
constituted by various types of communicators (citizens, consumers, activists, etc) using email, mobile
telephony, text messaging, digital cameras, electronic newspapers, and satellite television. This space’s
non-hierarchical nature invites a rethinking of Arab information dynamics.
Hypermedia space is changing Arab governance, i.e. the management of social relations between
citizens and of political relations between citizens and the state. The convergence of small media like
mobile phones and digital cameras, with big media like television and newspapers, has already changed
how information is accessed and controlled. The fluid political situation prevailing in most Arab countries,
attributed by many in the region to the neo-conservative theory of creative chaos that is widely believed
to guide U.S. Middle East policy, has emboldened activists to use information technologies for social and
political gain. Whether governments respond with repression, as in Egypt during the 2005 presidential
elections, with a mix of repression and accommodation, as in Saudi Arabia over the past decade, or
dissolution, as in Lebanon during the so-called 2005 “Cedar Revolution,” their relations with their citizens
have changed drastically in the new communication environment.
How does hypermedia space contribute to changing the ways in which Arab citizens and regimes
access, use, create and control information? How do the new information dynamics affect the way citizens
and governments relate to each other? To address these questions, this paper focuses on Saudi Arabia
and Lebanon, where recent social and political developments constitute propitious opportunities to explore
the impact of hypermedia space on Arab governance. These two countries play an instrumental role in
shaping the Arab information revolution and occupy the poles of the Arab socio-cultural spectrum. Saudi
Arabia is the Arab world’s most socially conservative nation where public life is ruled by the strictest
interpretations of Islamic texts. Lebanon is the Arab world’s most socially liberal society where Christians
assume an influential, albeit receding, public role. Whereas Saudi entrepreneurs with royal connections
finance Arab media, Lebanese journalists, producers and managers populate the industry’s ranks. For a
quarter century, the convergence of Saudi capital and Lebanese talent has driven major Arab media
developments that cannot be captured by simply a comparative study of the two countries since it would
gloss over the complexity of the connection between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Rather, Saudi Arabia and
Lebanon are better understood as a dynamic pair whose multi-faceted interactions shape a hypermedia
space that “covers” the entire Arab region.
Understanding the impact of hypermedia space on Arab governance requires a triple analysis of
socio-political context, technical developments, and major events that act as catalysts. It requires
addressing questions like: What are the social and political contexts that lead actors—activists, citizens,
viewers, callers, consumers, etc—to actively use information and media technologies to challenge
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prevailing (social, political, economic, etc) arrangements? Do “new” media increase the power of citizens
and governments to communicate and act? What catalyst-events trigger uses of technology for social and
political change? In a regional Arab situation of crisis and amidst intense global geo-political interest in the
Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon are experiencing political tensions that are different but related.
Both countries are awash with media and information technologies that operate within weak or inexistent
regulatory frameworks and policy regimes subservient to executive fiat. In this context, reality television
acts as a catalyst (among others) because its commercial and dramatic logics promote participation in
public events through the interactive use of information technologies, in activities like voting, mobilization,
and alliance building. In this article I seek to demonstrate how popular reality television programs help
establish dynamic links between socio-political contexts ripe for change and the technical capacities of new
media, thus activating hypermedia space.
Hypermedia space blurs boundaries between producers and consumers of information, between
popular culture and politics, and between various nationally-based cultural spheres brought into contact
by the transnational scope of hypermedia space. This article examines how one reality television program
in particular has contributed to changing the “social epistemology” —the public knowledge of technical
capacities—surrounding information technologies in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. This program, Star
Academy, has triggered controversy throughout the Arab world and articulated hot-button issues in Arab
public discourse, such as democratization, gender relations, and Western influence. This article will
endeavor to explain how various Saudi and Lebanese actors have appropriated Star Academy for social
and political purposes in the two countries, and how the public awareness of the hypermedia space
engendered by the program have affected the nature of governance in both countries. This article ––part
of a larger ongoing book manuscript on the social and political impact of Arabic-language reality
television–– concludes with a discussion of how hypermedia space contributes to shifts in the nature and
boundaries of social and political agency.
The Saudi-Lebanese Connection and the Arab Information Revolution
The military conflicts that have destabilized the Middle East since the end of World War Two have
been the main impetus for the development and growth of Arab media. War was either the raison d’être or
an opportunity to thrive for both Nasser’s Voice of the Arabs radio in the 1950s to Al-Jazeera in the 1990s.
Most analysts refer to the 1991 Gulf War as a momentous event that triggered the growth of Arab satellite
television. At that time, the Saudi government, which kept its citizens uninformed of Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait for three days, found that Saudis and viewers throughout the Arab world had turned to CNN for
information. Saudi rulers realized that they needed an Arabic-language counterbalance to CNN to expand
their regional influence, and Saudi businessmen close to the royal family saw a lucrative business
opportunity. The Saudi strategy of internationalizing Saudi media ownership, hitherto restricted to
newspapers, entered a crucial phase (see Boyd, 2001) with the 1991 launch of Middle East Broadcasting
Center (MBC) in London by the then Saudi king’s brother-in-law. At the same time, the Egyptian
government launched the Egyptian Satellite Channel (ESC) to preempt the effect of Saddam Hussein’s
propaganda on Egyptian soldiers deployed in the U.S. led Operation Desert Storm. These developments,
followed by the launch in 1996 of Al-Jazeera from Qatar and the satellite channels LBC and Future TV from

142 Marwan M. Kraidy

International Journal of Communication 1 (2007)

Lebanon (see Kraidy, 2002), and of Saudi-owned, Dubai-based Al-Arabiya in 2003 are milestones in the
history of Arab satellite television.
Before the onset of the Arab satellite revolution, the proliferation of unlicensed radio and
television stations during the 1975-1990 Lebanese war had developed a large pool of creative and
managerial talent. Political parties and warring factions launched several dozen unlicensed television
stations that functioned as mouthpieces. One of these stations is particularly relevant. The Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation went on the air in 1985 as a platform for the Christian-nationalist Lebanese
Forces militia, and rapidly became the most watched station in Lebanon. As the longest running privately
owned Arab television channel, LBC reflects the rise of American style broadcasting over the older,
European-inspired, system. This is evidenced by the station’s choice of a three-letter acronym name, its
focus on entertainment programs, and its reliance on advertisements. Even as a partisan voice in the war,
LBC from its early days was run as a business, for example broadcasting special Ramadan programs for
Muslim audiences during the civil war. The 1989 “Document of National Understanding” signed in the
resort Saudi city of Ta’ef, put an end to military conflict in Lebanon and called for the reorganization of the
Lebanese media within a “modern” regulatory framework. The resulting 1994 Audio-Visual Media Law was
hailed as the first broadcasting law in the Arab world, but its implementation favored media institutions
owned by leading politicians, cut down the number of television stations to 5 (Kraidy, 1998) and sent
hundreds of media professionals into unemployment.
Saudi entrepreneurs with plans to launch satellite television channels found a large pool of
qualified and available Lebanese media professionals lured by steady employment and big salaries. Their
hiring in the early 1990s followed a long history of Lebanese journalists and advertising executives
working in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. MBC hired many Lebanese before the 1994 Audio-Visual
Media Law and its 1996 implementation, but the hiring of Lebanese intensified after 1996. Another lure
was the promise of editorial independence since MBC studios were initially located in London. Dubai TV,
Al-Arabiya and others also have a high number of Lebanese on their staff. In 1996, when LBC and Future
TV initiated satellite broadcasting of entertainment programs, they compelled MBC, in operation on
satellite since 1991, to enhance its entertainment offerings and change the proportions of news, current
affairs and entertainment in its format. In the early 2000s, MBC and other channels moved to Dubai Media
City, a free-trade zone dedicated to media and information technology in the United Arab Emirates, and
now host to approximately 200 satellite channels. In 2003, the launch of Al-Arabiya, a 24-hour news
network, to counter Al-Jazeera, continued the “alliance” of Saudi money and Lebanese skills: Al-Arabiya is
currently headed by a Saudi General Manager, Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, and a Lebanese Director of
Programs, Nakhlé al-Hageii.
Star Academy and the Saudi-Lebanese Connection
The multiple entanglements of the Saudi-Lebanese connection and its decisive role in shaping
Arab hypermedia space are represented in the production and reception of LBC’s Star Academy, the most
popular and most controversial program in Arab satellite television history. The terrestrial station, LBC
International (LBCI) is registered in Lebanon and subject to Lebanese law. Its satellite channel AlFada’iyya Al-Lubnaniyya (The Lebanese Satellite Channel, known as LBC-Sat) on the other hand, is a
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multinational corporation registered in the Cayman Islands, primarily to circumvent Lebanese media
ownership laws. Since its founding in 1996, Saudis have owned nearly half of LBC-Sat. Saudi mogul Saleh
Kamel initially owned 49 % of the shares and was known to brag in public of his ability to influence
programming content, especially in curbing material of a sexual nature that he deemed inappropriate to
Saudi sensibilities (See Habib, 2003). For his own business reasons and also because LBC management
probably resisted his meddling, Kamel sold his shares to another Saudi mogul, prince Al-Walid Bin Talal,
Saudi royal and investor extraordinaire with interests in media companies. Bin Talal bought Kamel’s
shares for $ US 100 million in 2000, at which time the company was worth around US $ 200 million. With
this massive influx of equity, LBC gained the resources to compete regionally, in addition to a degree of
political protection since Bin Talal is close to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. Most importantly, LBC was
in position to “retaliate” to the challenge posed by MBC’s launch of Man Sa Yarbah Al-Malyun, the Arabic
version of Who Wants To Be A Millionnaire, the first Arabic television format-adaptation and the most
popular Arab satellite television program in the pre-Star Academy era. This Saudi-funded program
featured Lebanese host George Qordahi and Lebanese executive producer Salwa Suwayd, another product
of the Saudi-Lebanese connection.
Launched by LBC in December 2003, Star Academy, now with three seasons completed (this
analysis refers to the first season unless indicated otherwise), is a watershed Arab media event. Adapted
from a format owned by the Dutch format house Endemol after successful French and British adaptations,
Star Academy has a large staff by regional standards. It began with a pan-Arab casting campaign that
selected 16 young Arabs, including two Lebanese and one Saudi, from a pool of 3000 applicants (personal
interviews: Alavanthian, 2004; El-Daher, 2004 & 2005; Saad, 2004). Both LBCI and LBC-Sat broadcast
the show from “The Academy,” a four-story building near LBC headquarters, where contestants are
sequestered for the four months of the program. They are watched by viewers throughout the Arab world
every night during a half-hour show reporting on the day’s events and called “access”, in addition to a
two-hour weekly show airing on Friday called “prime.” A dedicated satellite channel called “LBC Reality”
broadcasts live scenes from the Academy, 24-hours a day for four months. Contestants spend their time
attending classes and rehearsals with teachers who each Monday nominate two contestants for possible
termination for non-satisfactory performance. The nomination kicks off five days of voting and
campaigning during which viewers build coalitions with friends, schoolmates, neighbors or family members
and send text messages to be aired on music television channels, all in support of the nominee they want
to stay in the program. These “democracy-like” activities conclude with the end of the Friday prime when
voting results are announced and the losing nominee exits the show.
Star Academy was instantly popular. Market researchers found massive audiences in most Arab
countries, breaking records in some. The show’s demographics included young and old, women and men,
urban and rural. Empty streets during daily “access” shows prompted some restaurant owners to complain
that Star Academy was bad for business while other restaurateurs increased their profits by setting up
large screens. The excitement reached its peak during the Friday “prime” when the weekly round of voting
ended and the results were released. Discussion boards, fan sites and blogs in Arabic, English and French
animated the internet. Text messages sent by viewers extolling favorite contestants were played on
moving screen tickers by music television channels and talk-shows and newscasts on Al-Jazeera and
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others reported the gossip, developments, and voting results. Star Academy was a media event, or, more
specifically, a “hypermedia event.”
As a production, Star Academy is a result of Saudi capital and Lebanese talent. As a hypermedia
event, it reflects the clash between the economic imperatives of the Saudi-Lebanese connection on the
one hand and the cultural differences between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon on the other. The program was
immensely popular in both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. According to IPSOS-STAT, an international polling
firm with a strong presence in the Middle East, Star Academy grabbed 80 % of the 15 to 25 audience in
Lebanon, and after a few weeks, according to market researchers I spoke with between May and July
2004, had captured a large proportion of the audience in Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, the program’s
popularity made it subject to daily editorial commentary and news reports, street conversations and
communal viewing. A Sunni Muslim cleric and a couple of journalists criticized the show, but with little
effect. In Saudi Arabia, however, as will be elaborated shortly, Star Academy was extremely controversial.
Star Academy articulated the central governance challenge in both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In
Lebanon, the challenge is political, and entails finding equilibrium between confessional identities and
national unity. In that context, this article will show how Star Academy was appropriated by anti-Syrian
demonstrators in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, its immense popularity making it an
effective political tool. In Saudi Arabia, the central challenge is social, and requires striking a balance
between strict interpretations of Islamic texts and what Saudi rulers regard as the imperatives of
modernization. As the next section illustrates, hypermedia space has made this ever-moving equilibrium
extremely precarious.
Governance, Hypermedia and Social Reality in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has a fragile political system whose backbone consists of the several thousand
members of the royal Al-Sa’ud family (see Salameh, 1980, for a historical analysis). The continuing
protection of the United States and the agreement between the Al-Sa’ud and Al-Shaykh families whereby
the former gives political protection to the latter while the latter endows the former with religious
legitimacy, are two pillars of the Saudi order. The alliance between Al-Sa’ud royals and Al-Shaykh clerics
has contained tensions between the enshrinement of Islamic values and the modernization drive espoused
by Saudi kings since the 1960s. Since the 1980s the royal family has positioned itself as an arbiter, albeit
authoritarian, between religious activists, liberal reformers, and business interests in the kingdom. In the
aftermath of terrorist attacks within their territory in the last few years, Saudi authorities have launched
their own campaign against radical violence in the kingdom and continue to cooperate with the United
States in its Middle East policy.
Media and information technologies have historically been at the center of debates and struggles
between various Saudi groups. Media issues are related to salient topics, such as Western influences on a
society that prides itself to be the cradle of Islam, and expose the Saudi paradox of a capitalistic economy
dependent on trade with foreigners in a conservative society with influential elements who are hostile to
foreign influences. Radio in the 1930s, television in the 1960s, satellite dishes and the internet in the
1990s, and mobile phones in the 2000s have triggered contentious debates about the Islamic common
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good, gender relations, and Western influence. For example, the impending introduction in the early
1960s of television to Saudi Arabia was vehemently opposed by religious clerics and activists, who argued
that television pictures violated the Islamic prohibition on reproducing human faces and figures. King
Faysal Ibn Sa’ud, however, was convinced that media and information technology were central to his
modernization drive. To garner support, he convened a meeting of critics and clerics and presented his
case:
Painting and sculpture are idolatry, but is light good or bad? The judges pondered and
replied that light is good; Allah put the sun in the heavens to light man’s path. Then
asked the King, is a shadow good or bad? There was nothing in the Qur’an about this,
but the judges deduced and ruled that shadows are good, because they are inherent in
light, and even a holy man casts a shadow. Very well then, said the King, photography is
good because it is nothing but a combination of light and shade, depicting Allah’s
creatures but leaving them unchanged (quoted in Eddy, 1963, p. 258).
Compromise through persuasion is a hallmark of Saudi governance and has historically prevented
tensions between contending forces in the kingdom from escalating. The decision to allow television into
the country came with strict censorship guidelines which among other things prohibited women who are
not fully clothed, who are dancing, participating in sports, or engaged in “overt acts of love;” in addition to
references (not exclusively to women) to betting, gambling, alcoholic beverages, Zionism, depictions of
violent or sexually arousing scenes, and denigration of the royal family, other countries, or any of the
“heavenly religions” (Shobaili, 1971). These guidelines were easy to enforce in the pre-satellite era, when
Saudi officials censored production, programming and transmission. The erosion of control initiated by
satellite broadcasting in the early 1990s increased with the development of hypermedia space in the
2000s, as the internet, then mobile telephones with digital cameras became ubiquitous.
The Internet was greeted with ambivalence in Saudi Arabia, with the government seeing its
potential for both modernization and subversion, while Islamist activists embraced it as a tool to “spread
good and combat evil.” The internet was introduced in 1999, and by April 2003, there were 21 functioning
internet service providers and around 1.6 million users (“Analysis: Saudi,” 2004). A February 12, 2001
ministerial resolution banning content critical of the Saudi state, advocating violence, or slanderous, sets
the censorship parameters enforced at the King ’Abdul ’Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), the
centralized Internet node for the entire country. According to Saudi Gazette, 25,000 new sites are blocked
every month (“Saudi Internet,” 2001).
Mobile phones were initially uncontroversial because they were considered culturally neutral. A
2003 report estimated the number of Saudi mobile lines to be double than the number of landlines
(respectively 7.2 to 3.5 million) (Saudi Arabia, 2004). This relaxed attitude changed with the introduction
of text-messaging, digital cameras, and especially Bluetooth wireless technology (see for example
“Bluetooth in,” 2005). Bluetooth gives a new twist to a well-established flirting ritual in Saudi Arabia in
which an interested youth surreptitiously throws a piece of paper with their phone number on it in front of
their object of attraction as their paths cross in a mall or other public space. Bluetooth updates this ritual
by enabling users to know whether the person they are interested in is amenable to conversation. The
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most important element of Bluetooth is that its activation signals a readiness to socialize. “Using Bluetooth
is much better than trying to throw the number to the girls through car windows, or in the shopping
center,” said a Saudi teenager, “through Bluetooth I guarantee that the other party chose to accept my
number or the file I sent. In other words, I don’t impose myself on anyone” (Aboud, 2005). The
Commission for Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil, a body with police powers operating from
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, thought otherwise, and many schools and gyms banned camera equipped
phones on their premises (Akeel, 2005). An April 2005 law stipulates 1000 lashes, 12 years in jail, and a
fine of 100,000 Saudi riyals, or around US $ 26, 670 for anyone caught engaging in “phone pornography”
(“New Saudi,” 2005). The popularity of Star Academy in Saudi Arabia intensified debate surrounding
interactive features of mobile phones such as Bluetooth and text-messaging.
Star Academy and Gender Relations in Saudi Arabia
Star Academy triggered a firestorm of controversy in Saudi Arabia. A columnist called it “a
whorehouse” and clerics distributed cassette-tapes of sermons titled “Satan Academy”, reflecting a hostile
segment of the social and religious elite (see Al-Dakhil, 2005). On the other hand, the program was very
popular and lucrative for telecommunications companies who profited from the voting process, since
viewers had to pay the equivalent of 2 or 3 $ US each time they voted via text-messaging. Saudi viewers
experienced tension between their attraction to the program and religious injunctions against it. As is
custom in Muslim societies, viewers sought religious opinions, known as fatwas, to resolve the conflict.
The numbers of fatwas about Star Academy requested by viewers was so great that the “Permanent
Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of Fatwas,” which is one of the highest religious
authorities in the nation, issued a detailed fatwa which prohibited financing, watching, discussing, voting,
or participating in Star Academy (“Fatwa Concerning,” 2004) As custom dictates, the fatwa was replete
with isnad, references that grounded and found support for it in the Qur’an, Islam’s holy book, and Hadith,
the collected speeches of the Prophet Muhammad. It began with a preamble that includes the committee’s
finding that:
After studying the matter, the Committee thinks that these shows should be banned and
it is haram to watch them, finance them, take part in them, call them to vote or to
express admiration of them, because of what these shows include of allowing forbidden
things concerning which there is consensus that they are forbidden, and doing so
brazenly… What brazenness in committing haram and immoral actions can be worse
than these shows which include a number of serious evils?
The evils include “free mixing of the sexes,” “blatant promotion of immorality,” and “the call to remove
modesty and pride from the hearts of Muslims.” After explaining these points, the clerics conclude with the
injunction to Saudi viewers that:
It is not sufficient for you to abstain from watching these shows; you should also advise
and remind those whom you know watch them or take part in them in any way, because
that comes under the heading of cooperating in righteousness and piety, and forbidding
one another to engage in sin and transgression.
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The central source of anger and objection in Saudi Arabia was Star Academy’s portrayal of gender
relations. The prevention of ikhtilat, or gender mixing, is the pillar of Saudi social organization. Wahhabi
doctrine considers hudud, or the boundaries between public and private space, divinely decreed in the
Qur’an and therefore sacred. Men and women are only allowed to interact once sanctioned by marriage
and only in private space.
Star Academy violates the key rule restricting male-female interaction to private family space
since males and female participants in the show share living space for 4 months. Although bedrooms and
bathrooms are separate, male and female contestants interact closely, touch each other’s bodies often,
and dance on stage together. Some “access” shows even featured pillow fights and occasional incursions
of members of one gender into the sleeping quarters of the other. There were also rampant rumors of
sexual affairs, the most persistent of which involved Bashar the Kuwaiti and Sophia the Moroccan. The
fatwa of the Standing Committee for Academic Research and Issuing Fatwas makes it very clear that the
central concern was the role of women in society and their relations with men, lingering on the
“immorality” of indecently dressed women, and mentioning explicitly women who look directly into men’s
eyes and women who dance in “seductive” ways.
According to Fatima Mernissi (1987), a leading feminist sociologist from Morocco, Islamic
theology believes that female sexuality is active while male sexuality is passive. As a result, she argues,
controlling women’s sexuality is essential for social order because giving free reign to women’s sexual
desires brings fitna, or discord, upon Muslim societies. In addition to religion, history makes the status of
women a particularly sensitive issue in the Arab world because of past attempts by French and British
colonial powers to change indigenous laws related to women. As a result, the status of women historically
evolved into a symbol of cultural and religious authenticity, and of resistance to colonial and imperial
power. By featuring active and attractive women who interact closely and compete with men, Star
Academy violates rules of male-female interaction that prevail in Saudi Arabia.
While on the screen every episode of Star Academy displays multiple violations of hudud, the
interactions the show activates in hypermedia space call for the active violation of sacred boundaries by
Muslim viewers. The Internet is awash with pictures of Star Academy participants and video segments of
the show. Bloggers scrutinize individual performances and evaluate voting results. Perhaps more
importantly, by repeatedly inviting people to vote by text-messaging using their mobile phone, Star
Academy helps develop public awareness of the technical capacities of information technologies. Because
its dramatic structure and financial performance depends on viewers’ votes, Star Academy helped
disseminate the idea of information technology as a lifestyle device. Once only a business tool, mobile
phones have now become a social industry of their own, including personalized accessories, and ringtones.
The best example is perhaps the so-called “Islamic phone,” a mobile phone with a lunar calendar, special
rings at prayer times, and even a compass pointing the holy city of Mecca. Interactive television shows
like Star Academy at the same time promote and depend on the new “electronic” lifestyle. Turn on an
Arab music video channel at any hour of the day or night, and tickers moving at the bottom of the screen
display love messages between young Arabs who usually reveal only their first name while small
multimedia colored flags sometimes declare the text-messenger’s nationality. There are even digital love
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scales, with groups of friends voting on the compatibility of two people they know. Arab hypermedia space
hosts social relations that are frowned upon in Saudi public space.
Media and Governance in Lebanon
While Star Academy posed a social challenge to Saudi governance, in Lebanon it articulated a
political struggle, in line with that country’s history of political and media fragmentation. Lebanon’s
experience with the mass media is unique in the Arab world and influential beyond the country’s small
territory. Since the 19th century, Lebanese journalists have founded major Arab newspapers, including
Egypt’s Al-Ahram and Saudi Arabia’s Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. In the television era, Lebanon was the only Arab
country not to have a fully state-owned national television station. Launched at the initiative of private
business interests approached the government for a broadcasting license in the 1950s, Télé-Liban was,
from its founding in 1959 until the early 2000s, a hybrid, half-private, half-state owned entity. In wartime,
several unlicensed competitors outperformed Télé-Liban, and in the early postwar years the station’s
private shares functioned as a “spare tire” for politicians who were uncertain about getting a license.
When licenses were awarded in 1996 according to the 1994 Audio-Visual Media Law, Télé-Liban fell into a
protracted decline (see Kraidy, 2005).
Just as Télé-Liban was symptomatic of a weak state, its unlicensed competitors symbolized the
strength of civil society and confessional politics. The war precipitated the creation of a media landscape
as diverse and fractured as Lebanon: conservative and radical, Christian and Muslim, secular and
religious, capitalist and communist. The postwar regulatory challenge consisted in finding a formula that
restored the authority of the state while preserving a politically representative media system. The
licensing process was nakedly political, distributing licenses to leading politicians according to the
Lebanese confessional power-sharing formula, which distributes resources and positions according to
sectarian affiliation. Thus there was a Maronite station (LBC), a Sunni station (Future TV), a Shiia station
(National Broadcasting Network, or NBN) and a Greek Orthodox station with Druze influence (Murr
Television, or MTV). Additional licenses were later given to Hizbullah’s Al-Manar, to a Christian station
operated by the Maronite clergy, Télé-Lumière, and to New TV, formerly owned by the Lebanese
communist party (Kraidy, 1998). The equilibrium achieved by licensing stations according to confessional
criteria, periodically shaken by inflammatory broadcasts or state harassment (Kraidy, 1999)—and with the
notable exception of the shutdown of MTV in September 2003—lasted until the tumultuous events of
2005.
Television assumed a central political role on February 14, 2005, when a massive car bomb killed
the former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, on a major Beirut seaside thoroughfare. Future TV reacted
immediately to the late morning bombing that killed its founder, and morphed into a full-time anti-Syrian
screen clamoring for Lebanese independence. A diagonal black band on Future TV’s logo signaled
mourning and an on-screen digital calendar marked the days since Hariri’s assassination. The channel
became a full-time propaganda machine, celebrating Hariri’s legacy, attacking the Syrian regime widely
perceived to be behind the assassination, and keeping a focus on the UN investigation initially headed by
German judge Detlev Mehlis. Future TV talk-shows featured a parade of anti-Syrian speakers while special
music videos and promotional clips asking for “The Truth” flooded the program grid. This situation
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prevailed until December 2005, when a new general manager was asked to bring Future TV back to a
semblance of normalcy to stop the gaping financial losses of the previous eleven months (personal
interview: Aintrazi, 2005). LBC, whose political bosses were allies of Hariri’s block in parliament, focused
exclusively on the assassination only for a few days before going back to regular programming, thus
avoiding the crippling financial repercussions of “opening the air” completely to the Hariri story. Both
Future TV and LBC’s editorial lines were highly critical of the Syrians and favorable to US and European
intervention against Syria.
On the opposite side, New TV, owned by Hariri foe Tahssin Khayyat, and Hizbullah’s Al-Manar
expressed a different narrative, opposed to Western interference in Lebanon and concerned about “U.S.Israeli plans” for the region. While they did not explicitly support Syrian interference in Lebanon, both
stations refrained from criticizing the Syrian regime and both were critical of the UN Mehlis investigation.
New Television, who in the past had been critical of the Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus, propounded
the secular version while Al-Manar put forth a religiously colored rendition of the situation. Both channels
questioned the version of events given by the other side, oftentimes in a tit-for-tat direct questioning of
facts. For instance, both stations raised suspicions about the number of demonstrators on March 14, 2005,
which was over 1 million according to LBC and Future Television. When Future Television showed footage
of demonstrators and claimed they were not Lebanese, Al-Manar retaliated by inviting some of the
persons shown to demonstrate, on live television, that they were, in fact, Lebanese.
Reality Television and Hypermedia in the Cedar Revolution
If initial responses to Hariri’s assassination confirmed that television stations in Lebanon
remained primarily political instruments, the demonstrations that ensued, known as the “Cedar
Revolution,” indicate that the participatory activities called for by a program like Star Academy, like voting
by mobile phone, using text-messaging to build alliances and promote contestants, can in some cases
have concrete political applications. The ways in which demonstrators used mobile phones, television and
vocabulary from Star Academy and other reality television programs suggests that the combination of
hypermedia space and popular culture can have a powerful impact on public life in the Arab world.
Several signs using the language of reality television could be seen among protesting crowds
during the “Cedar Revolution.” This was evident in the massive March 14, 2005, “opposition”
demonstration against the Syro-Lebanese security apparatus, whose main demands were the withdrawal
of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the resignation of Lebanon’s leading politicians and security officers.
Consider a hand-made, English-language sign carried by a demonstrator: the words “Lahoud Nominee”
(referring to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, whose term was illegitimately extended by Syrian fiat) sit
atop the exhortation “call 1559” (in reference to the United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal
from Lebanon of Syrian troops and intelligence operatives). The sign is effective because it replicates
weekly reality television rituals like nomination, mobilization, and voting, with which a vast number of
Arab viewers are familiar.
When this ritual is transposed onto a sign carried by a Beirut demonstrator and captured by the
cameras of myriad Arab satellite television channels and individual mobile phones equipped with digital
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cameras, it articulates a political agenda concisely and effectively. It uses a vocabulary that most Arabs,
familiar with Star Academy, recognize and understand. The message on the sign, consisting of a few
words and four digits, is eminently media-savvy in an age of image and sound bites. Expressing a complex
political issue in a snapshot rich with meaning, it is perfect material for the frantic and repetitive news
cycle of channels such as Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera in addition to CNN and other Western networks. Since
nominations and Short Messaging Service voting are part of reality television rituals worldwide, the
message has a potentially global audience. Satellite television financed by Saudi Arabian tycoons brought
Lebanese politics to pan-Arab audiences, and popular culture made it widely palpable.
Reality television responded directly to Hariri’s death in a way that one expects from news but
not from entertainment media. Lebanese channels are pan-Arab leaders in entertainment programming
and have produced and broadcast the most highly rated Arab reality television programs. Superstar, the
Arabic version of American Idol, has completed three successful seasons on Future TV (Kraidy, 2006a &
b). Star Academy is aired by LBC, a channel that has historically opposed Syrian intervention in Lebanon.
Immediately after Hariri’s assassination, Future TV suspended regular programming, unified its hitherto
separate terrestrial and satellite broadcasts, and postponed indefinitely the third installment of Superstar.
However, previous Superstar contestants were summoned to record patriotic songs and shoot music
videos that were incessantly played for months.
On Star Academy, a rehearsal was interrupted live on the air to announce Hariri’s death. Then
LBC went into a week of mourning. Unlike Future TV, LBC did not suspend its regular programs, but
dedicated current affairs news and talk-shows to the issue. The Star Academy prime that followed the
mourning period turned into a patriotic fest where contestants hailing from throughout the Arab world
sang patriotic Lebanese songs against the backdrop of a huge Lebanese flag. The dénouement,
presumably called in by millions of Arab voters (but, as the rumor mill suggested, possibly staged by LBC
officials), was pure political spectacle: The Syrian contestant was voted out, and an eerie silence wrapped
her humiliating exit from the stage.
The unceremonious on-stage dismissal of the Syrian candidate symbolically echoed the forced
resignation of Omar Karameh, who was Lebanon’s prime minister. In a rare moment in Arab politics,
popular demonstrations had compelled a leader to resign. The importance of this event should not be
underestimated. With thousand of Syrian troops still on Lebanese land and their colleagues in the
mukhabarat (secret police) still haunting Lebanese streets and psyches, hundreds of thousands of
demonstrators nonetheless called for and obtained the resignation of a sitting prime minister backed by
Syria. Of course, without the support of the United States and France, who found a shared national
interest in the Lebanese issue, and the tacit approval of Saudi Arabia, the Beirut demonstrations may have
been quelled. Nonetheless the television cameras of Arab (Saudi funded) and Western channels, feeding
live pictures to a worldwide audience, played a crucial role in sustaining the demonstrations. The
demonstrators did not take US-French-Saudi support for granted, but courted and nurtured it, putting on
an attractive visual spectacle for television cameras that took scenes and pictures that were then sent
back and forth in an activated hypermedia space.
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The demonstrators on Beirut’s Martyrs Square were media savvy. Their main message was
“national unity.” Early on, leaders of the opposition agreed to instruct their followers to wave nothing but
Lebanese flags. This strategy preempted state repression under the guise of banning sectarian
demonstrations and preserving national unity. The demonstrations against Syria’s policies towards
Lebanon were organized by the “March 14 Opposition,” a heterogenous coalition of political forces that cut
across Lebanon’s various religious communities, and included a variety of student, professional, and civil
society groups and unions. Media and public relations professionals put together a human Lebanese flag
made of 10,000 people holding cardboard squares painted in white, green or red. Young women painted
small Lebanese flags on their cheeks like English soccer fans, and the less inhibited among them painted
the flag on other body parts certain to attract the cameras. The absence of the usual multi-colored range
of flags representing sectarian or partisan loyalties and the proliferation of Lebanese flags had a symbolic
impact on swaths of public opinion in a country ordinarily marred by multiple political, religious and social
cleavages. The “other” demonstration, organized by Hizbullah and its allies, also featured a proliferation of
Lebanese flags (It is important to note that the Free Patriotic Movement, headed by retired army General
Michel Aoun, was a major participant in the March 14 demonstrations, but later broke with the Hariridominated coalition that organized these demonstrations and concluded a memorandum of understanding
with Hizbullah).
The Beirut demonstrators exploited hypermedia space to their full political advantage, using
mobile phones, digital cameras and the internet, in addition to courting television news cameras.
Demonstrators took pictures using their mobile phones equipped with digital cameras, which they
promptly transmitted to news organizations or to friends who uploaded them on websites dedicated to
their cause. These “citizen-correspondents,” as a columnist in the Lebanese daily newspaper Assafir called
them, ensured that their cause would be seen across the world. Unlike the conspicuous CNN and AlJazeera cameras, the invisible cameras of thousands of demonstrators acted as non-obtrusive surveillance
system that went a long way in preempting repression by the security apparatus. The proliferation of
cameras is likely to have contributed to preventing clashes between demonstrators and counterdemonstrators, no easy feat when one considers that between one and a half to two million Lebanese, or
between a third of or half of the total population of the country, descended on the streets of Beirut in the
span of a week in March 2005.
When the Lebanese army established checkpoints around central Beirut to prevent demonstrators
from reaching demonstration sites, soldiers at some checkpoints whispered to the demonstrators that they
supported them, a nugget of information that was immediately “blasted” via text messages, allowing
demonstrators to converge on checkpoints where soldiers or commanding officers appeared sympathetic
to their cause. At other checkpoints, young women put red roses in soldiers’ hands and rifles, thus
“disarming” them and helping flows of men and women alerted via text-messaging “blasts” to reach
designated protest areas. Mobile phones helped demonstrators mobilize and organize; cameras and reality
television vocabulary helped them propagate their message.
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Hypermedia Space, Reality Television and the Future of Arab Governance
The hypermedia space resulting from multiple configurations between various media can be said
to be an alternative space for Arab social and political relations. Shaped primarily by the Saudi-Lebanese
connection, Arab hypermedia space is taken up in different ways in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. How
hypermedia space is used is therefore dependent on political context, availability of technology, and most
importantly the willingness of people to use hypermedia space for specific purposes. The commercial and
dramatic logics of reality television help to activate these hypermedia flows. Viewers of Star Academy
consume and produce information about contestants on the Internet, mobilize and create voting coalitions
using mobile phones, read and write about them in the papers, and create blogs or fan sites. They
respond to “expert” opinions by journalists and talk-show guests who comment on reality television.
Reality television, in other words, brings knowledge of hypermedia space to the everyday, mundane level.
As a result, whether posing a social challenge in Saudi Arabia or articulating a political struggle in
Lebanon, hypermedia space is contributing to changes in Arab governance. Viewers participating in reality
television rituals learn that sending a flow of text-messages in favor of a Star Academy contestant to
music television channels that post them on moving tickers, helps generate chatter about the contestant
in question and thereby increase their visibility and ultimately their chances of outlasting the competition.
This knowledge can be tapped by political activists who “plug into” networks of friends and acquaintances
engaged or familiar with reality television, converting them partially into instruments of political
mobilization. The resulting large numbers of demonstrators, once on television news, become a potent
tool of political pressure in the context of Arab politics, where leaders are increasingly concerned with their
legitimacy. Arab leaders also know that in a media saturated world where Arab regimes are under the
microscope of the Bush II administration and international public opinion, in addition to internal pressures
of various kinds, clamping down on demonstrators can be counter-productive.
The flags, cameras and mobile phones did not, on their own, prevent the Syrian-Lebanese
security apparatus from repressing the demonstrators, but their combination with pressure from the
United States, France and Saudi Arabia did. Saudi Arabia, whose billionaires finance Arab media, was on
the side of the “Cedar Revolution,” so Saudi officials did not attempt to limit coverage of the
demonstrations. In addition, LBC and Future TV, two powerful outlets, were supportive of the “March 14”
demonstrators. The alignment of the political economic structure of Arab media with the interest of the
Lebanese demonstrators and against the Syrian regime made the “Cedar Revolution” a more important
event than it would have otherwise been. The potency of hypermedia space depends on the ability of
activists to use media and information technologies but also on the political decisions of “big” media
owners, a dependence that is nonetheless not complete since Al-Jazeera, opposed to the Saudi regime
and to United States policies in the Middle East, gave sustained and overall positive coverage to the Beirut
demonstrations.
In Saudi Arabia, hypermedia space is radically different from the heavily policed public space
where interaction between non-married males and females
is strictly prohibited. The interactivity and mobility inherent in hypermedia space subverts a principle that
is at the heart of Saudi social organization. The popularity of reality television, coupled with the wide
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availability of information technology, in a socially restrictive context, activates new information
permutations that undermine the social order. The most important challenge probably resides in the
“alternative” male-female relations portrayed on Star Academy, with women interacting and competing
with men. Similarly, hypermedia space empowers Saudi women who are disempowered in Saudi public
space (Interestingly, the February 12, 2006 resolution about the Internet does not explicitly mention
women or sexual issues). It is no coincidence that women make up two thirds of Saudi internet users
(“Country Profile,” 2006). When people purposely use deterritorialized, interactive and mobile technologies
such as the internet and mobile telephones, they can undermine social and political boundaries from
within, and therefore they are much more difficult to control. Under propitious politico-economic
conditions, hypermedia space acts potentially as an incubator of social change.
In Lebanon, hypermedia space contributed to the momentum of a political coalition that went
from being the opposition in March 2005 to taking the majority of seats in the Parliament by June of the
same year. For more than a decade, Lebanese security forces in coordination with Syrian intelligence, had
quelled demonstrations, jailed activists, and harassed anyone suspected of political opposition. While a
changing geopolitical climate and U.S.-French support were instrumental to the initial success of the
“Cedar Revolution,” the judicious use of small and big media connections by the demonstrators was an
important factor in sustaining the movement. Besides mobilization and coordination, hypermedia space
was a crucial tool in conveying an image of national unity—albeit contrived, temporary and fragile— that
prevented security forces from justifying a clampdown on activists with the claim of controlling sectarian
demonstrations. Thus demonstrators made the Lebanese flag, as a putative symbol of national unity,
ubiquitous, painted on signs and bodies, posted on websites, and most importantly saturating television
footage.
By making the capacities of hypermedia space visible to Arab viewers, interactive, multimediausing reality television shows like Star Academy pose a social challenge in Saudi Arabia and articulates a
political struggle in Lebanon. In these two countries and elsewhere in the Arab world, activists struggling
to grab social and political agency, that is, the ability to not follow a predetermined course of action, find
hypermedia space useful because agency resides partly in hypermedia space. Bolter and Grusin argue that
“[M]edia do have agency, but that agency … is constrained and hybrid … the agency of cultural change is
located on the interaction of formal, material, and economic logics that slip into and out of the grasp of
individuals and social groups” (Bolter and Grusin, 1999, p. 78). When individuals and communities
“connect” and activate information configurations towards achieving social or political objectives, they
fulfill the agency potential of hypermedia space (albeit tactically and temporarily, as it turned out in the
case of Lebanon). Most importantly, as examples discussed previously demonstrate, hypermedia space
operates as a tool to extend the scope of agency into “real” public space.
The social and political significance of hypermedia space will probably outlast the current craze of
reality television. When individuals engaging in contentious politics become producers of information, old
understandings about the political impact of mass media and the formation of public opinion no longer
make sense. The most significant development in the Arab public sphere is the ease and speed in which
information circulates between myriad information technologies with varying size, scope and uses.
Information therefore originates from new groups, circulates in new ways and reaches new publics.
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These new information dynamics in the Arab world are already having profound political
consequences. Arab publics know that “big” media outlets are bound by their funders’ agendas. AlJazeera’s editorial line will not violate the principles of Qatari foreign policy, and Al-Arabiya is an
instrument of Saudi policy. Similarly, al-Hurra is unable to shed the stigma of being a tool of the U.S.
government, and mainstream Western news outlets rarely oppose their governments’ foreign policies. The
use of “small” media, on the other hand, depends on the work of interconnected small groups of activists
who know and trust each other. This trust endows the information circulated between them with a level of
believability that governments and big media newsmakers can only dream about. Increasingly mediasavvy,

technology-proficient

and

politically

emboldened,

aided

by

the

converging

interests

of

telecommunications and media corporations, these groups are poised to continue stirring the Arab political
soup. Even as the reality television craze appears to be losing steam, it has unleashed new information
configurations that will outlast it.
While talk of reality television directly bringing democracy to the Arab world is based on
incomplete analyses and an overly-optimistic outlook, Arab activists have drawn lessons from the reality
television phenomenon that they are now using more or less successfully in political action. In this
environment, top-down communication strategies may lose “heart-and-minds” battles to small groups of
mobile, motivated and networked activists. Arab governments and U.S. “public diplomacy” strategists
appear to be late in learning the same lesson. Centralized broadcasting facilities, in Cairo or Springfield
(headquarters of the unsuccessful U.S. government Arabic-language television channel al-Hurra),
increasingly look like massive artillery canons shooting blanks, while activist groups have shown they are
capable of scoring political points with the tools of the digital age with laser beam precision. The
constantly shifting communication order—or disorder— they are creating is poised to influence Arab
governance as governments and large-scale mass media organizations could be reduced to watching and
commenting, or, more ominously, co-opting hypermedia space and its nascent publics.
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i

This article is part of a book project on the social and political impact of Arab reality television and offers

intermediary analysis based on 16 months of non-continuous fieldwork in Beirut, Dubai, Kuwait, Paris and
London, including 100 interviews with media producers, directors, and commentators. Fieldwork was
partly funded by the United States Institute of Peace and American University’s Research Competition
Award. Writing was mostly done when the author was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars in Washington, DC., from September 2005 to May 2006. The section about Saudi Arabia
draws heavily on Kraidy, Marwan M. (2006, September). Hypermedia and Governance in Saudi Arabia,
First Monday, www.firstmonday.org, which benefited from considerable feedback from Sandra Braman and
Thomas Malaby.
ii

Dawud-Al-Sharyan, a Dubai-based journalist, was appointed in October 2006 as Deputy General

Manager of Al-Arabiya, reflecting a trend to employ more Saudis and Gulf Arabs in Saudi-owned
companies.

